Holding Undercover Cops Accountable at Home and Abroad: Examples from the UK; Lessons for Norway
by Reidar Visser
To the left, Eirik Jensen and Tom Østreng of the SO department of the Oslo police in 2007. What were their units up to in the first half of 2011?
Across the democratic world, a new accountability problem relating to the police is evolving: How can one best rein in the myriad of new police units that perform “undercover” operations, often of an illegal nature, in the name of a shadowy fight against a vague category of evil referred to as “organised crime”?
Unlike the traditional secret police – which in most democratic countries is recognised as a serious threat to democracy that should be monitored by independent institutions – supposedly “non-political” secret police has mushroomed in recent decades with references to the need to combat “organised crime” but with zero democratic oversight. Since these new police units are not spies in the traditional sense, they are not covered by traditional oversight mechanisms relating to the secret services. For their part, traditional “independent” police commissions appear to have very little knowledge about how the organised crime unit units work and what exactly they are doing, for example when they use “disruption” as an alternative to prosecution. Such independent police commissions can perhaps deal with things like deaths in custody or injuries when someone is apprehended by the police. But they appear almost paralysed in the face of the challenge of “untraditional” police methods such as conspicuous surveillance and police stalking.
New police methods frequently used for “disruption” involve systematic violations of basic human rights like habeas corpus, the presumption of innocence and the principle of legality. In countries that adhere to the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (1984), many aspects of these police methods are deeply illegal according to anti-torture legislation in force. In fact, in terms of potential jail sentences, police officers who engage in harassment operations that constitute degrading punishment are in many jurisdictions in exactly the same category as murderers of the worst sort. And yet, these criminal police officers often continue to operate and go unpunished; in some countries they even make careers in the state bureaucracy.
In a post-communist process of globalisation that combines the worst of two worlds – NYPD repression techniques meet those of Eastern Germany’s Stasi – these shadowy “organised crime” outfits continue to grow in monstrosity as sophisticated technological developments enable ever more invasive illegal operations against innocent citizens. There is, in other words, a serious and acute accountability gap relating to modern policing in the Western world. Thankfully though, at least in some democratic countries, the free press, activists or individual politicians have the courage to ask questions about police criminality on the rise. In Canada, the Star newspaper has brought attention to the widespread practice of undercover police lying in court, prompting a change in the ways courts deal with these cases. In New Zealand, the controversy around the Dotcom case has given rise to increased focus on at least some of the illegalities of undercover police more generally, including the agency for fighting organised crime (OFCANZ). And in the UK, a Green representative in the London city council, Jenny Jones, has recently presented an elaborate list of queries regarding the Metropolitan police’s undercover operations, with particular emphasis on their conduct abroad.
The efforts of Jenny Jones in London are particularly interesting because they constitute a possible paradigm of action that brave parliamentarians in other countries could emulate. Here is what Jones asked:
Similar questions should be asked in relation to Norway. In Norway, the organised crime section of the Oslo police has some of Europe’s worst state-sponsored human rights criminals on its payroll, and a budget half the size of the entire Norwegian secret police. But there is zero oversight. With impunity, these fascist thugs commit human rights crimes at home and abroad, give presentations in academic forums such as the University of Oslo, and even publicly rub shoulders with high-ranking Labour politicians and government ministers. I have myself experienced more than 600 days of persecution, harassment and torture at the hands of these criminal types. My case, in turn, is connected to the wider failure of Norwegian police intelligence in the months immediately before the Oslo and Utøya terror attacks on 22 July 2011, which killed almost 100 Norwegians. In a well-working police system, the intelligence branch within the Oslo organised crime section headed by Hege Naustdal would have detected Anders Behring Breivik for his radical internet writings and then alerted the special undercover branch, Spesielle Operasjoner headed by Eirik Jensen. This never happened. Instead, resources and manpower from these units were diverted to the illegal operation against me in the UK, US, Canada, Qatar, Jordan, Italy, France and the Netherlands during the months between March and July 2011 – exactly when they should have been keeping tabs on the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik.
In Norway, there is no local-level parallel to the powerful London council with an ability to supervise the police. Instead, the Oslo police receives its funding directly from the Norwegian parliament, and it is parliamentarians (or the free press) that must ask critical questions regarding the Oslo police.
Here are the questions related to the Oslo police that the Norwegian director of the police and the Norwegian minister of justice should be asked as a matter of urgency:
What was the undercover intelligence branch within the organised crime section headed by Hege Naustdal doing in the period August 2010-May 2011, and why did it fail to detect Breivik when it had a specific duty to keep tabs on political extremism?
How many hours were spent by the SO unit headed by Eirik Jensen and Tom Østreng in disruption/conspicuous surveillance operations around Bislett and CJ Hambros Plass in the period between February and March 2011?
Were personnel in the Stop unit headed by Harald Bøhler at any point involved in operations unrelated to prostitution during the course of 2011?
What where personnel of the SO unit doing abroad in the period March-May 2011?
How many Norwegian police officers in total arrived at Newark airport in the afternoon on 25 March 2011?
What were those same officers doing in the small town of Princeton, NJ in the period 26-30 March 2011?
Why was a high-ranking officer of the Oslo police inside the Library of Congress special collections of newspapers in Washington, DC on 1 April 2011?
What was a Norwegian police officer doing aboard flight UA 917 from Washington Dulles to Seattle on 26 April 2011?
How many Norwegian police officers in total were in Seattle, WA between 26 April and 3 May 2011?
How many Norwegian police officers were aboard flight QR 52 from Washington DC to Doha, Qatar on 7 May 2011?
What were Norwegian police officers doing inside the guarded conference area of “Enriching the Middle East’s Economic Future” at the Sheraton hotel in Doha, Qatar between 8 and 10 May 2011?
How many Norwegian police officers visited the small Dutch coastal town of Noordwijk during the course of 2011?
Why did not the official police evaluation after the 22 July terror attacks address the complete intelligence failure of the organised crime section of the Oslo police?
What did the Oslo police chief, the director of Norwegian police, the chief of Kripos, the head of the police section at the ministry of justice, and the minister of justice know about the above travel activity during the course of 2011?
How many million Norwegian kroner in total were spent on these travel activities in 2011?
Why was there Norwegian police in the business class cabin on flight KL 807 from Amsterdam to Taipei (Taiwan) on 15 July 2012, travelling on tickets that came at a price of EUR 3,000 a piece?
I have in my previous writings put forward very serious charges against the Norwegian police. I am basically contending that Norway does not deserve its excellent human rights reputation and that the unchecked influence of the organised crime section of the Oslo police in particular gives the country certain semi-authoritarian and police-state characteristics. Wouldn’t it have been great if Norwegian police could provide clear and public answers to the above questions instead of having to whisper and cast slurs on my mental health and sexual orientation? Is the silence of the Oslo police, the police directorate and the minister of justice simply caused by the fact that they cannot provide those answers without lying in public?
If brave Norwegians parliamentarians could emulate the example of Jenny Jones in London, perhaps also the Norwegian rule of law system can be rescued from new and totalitarian forms of policing.
Just doing some more thinking about all this. I still have trouble agreeing with you on the cause of your persecution being street photography or your self described status as sexual minority. If you’d put two and two together one would have to think that nowadays they have some sort of eugenics program to get rid of undesirable elements of society who behave in questionable manner. Not illegal, but questionable. And questionable only if you look at it from certain angle as you mentioned your photography is controversial, but legal. So these modern day death squads would torture perceived “antisocial” elements until they self-destruct, mentally ill, imprisoned or dead. If you think every single person do behave in questionable manner. It all depends on the prism viewed at it and who looks through it. You can put a spin on any activity and paint it as negative, questionable or suspicious as long as it’s performed by person of interest.
On the other hand the growing number of seemingly innocent people who are being targeted (or paranoid about being targeted) has grown a lot in recent years. What is this? Is it only because of readily available platform? Who benefits? Is it cleansing of society by isolating undesirables or some twisted way to increase big pharma profits by increasing numbers of induced mental illnesses? 21st century untouchables? Is it about laying groundwork for a new threat for society to be afraid after terrorism b.s. wanes out? We hear only about targeting of people when they speak out on the Internet. How many do not take their problems to the Internet and burst out dealing with it in violent or self destructive ways? I’m trying to understand how do innocent people get caught in this terrible net that is supposedly is created to target organized crime or whatever the label that could be. No matter how I look it at the moment I see as a tool where certain people can be removed from the meaningful existence only because they are in a way to someone who has power of authority to execute this weapon. It would be interesting to take suicide, court ordered mental evaluations or suspicious death statistics and compare against some factors like money used to fight organized crime or try similar correlations… Incidentally my country is number one according to suicide rates.
I’ve come upon grant given by EU to Finland (in conjunction with 5 other European countries) to further pursuit the development of project called “Disruption of the Structures of Organised Crime through the Means of Organisational Psychology” (Reference JLS/2007/ISEC/AG/023). Of course the summary of the project is vague and nondescript, but it would be interesting to read it especially since project leader and her strong academic interest in psychopathy and stalking research.
Thanks for the useful reference. Lots of suspicious cooperation between mediocre academics & shady police organisations in that EU collection of research projects. I always suspected there might be some kind of EU madness involved in my case, even though it was initiated by a non-EU country (Norway). I’ll look into all of these project outlines.
There are several people who have experienced various kinds of harassment by Norwegian authorities. Some testimonies are collected at http://www.fampo.no/surveillance.html (some more in Norwegian at http://www.fampo.info/vitnesbyrd.html ). That you publish your experiences is a welcome and important contribution.
Especially the excerpt from Radio Modum should have some interest (http://www.fampo.no/detskjultenorge.html). Both Dag Hiåsen, Fampo’s leader, and the editor of the local newspaper in the area where he lives, told about harassment. But also Mr. Grønlund from the local radio station told the listeners that he had experienced some real demonstrative behaviour after Radio Modum started their program “Det skjulte Norge” (The veiled Norway). One can wonder how likely it is that all these three people, two of them editors from the same area, turn paranoid during a relatively short period…
Erik Strand
De Michel Dakar
Cher monsieur Visser
Vous devriez vous poser la question du lien pourtant évident entre ce que vous écriviez sur l’Irak, et les menées de certains services spéciaux à votre encontre.
Ce qui est maintenant flagrant est que certaines questions se règlent d’une manière innacoutumée, maintenant.
C’est justement cela qu’il faut faire savoir.
Et cela ne se passe pas uniquement en Norvège, mais aussi en France, et sans doute dans tous les pays régis par l’OTAN.
En ce qui concerne l’usage de matériels spéciaux, du type émetteur d’ondes nocives, ce qui n’a d’ailleurs rien de bien extraordinaire, il y a des appareillages permettant de mesurer ces ondes, et il existe des spécialistes qu’on peut missionner pour étudier ce phénomène. On le fait bien déjà avec les relais de téléphones portables, les wifi et autres.
Cela serait aussi dommage de s’en priver, tant ce procédé d’envoi d’ondes nocives, invisibles, et qui passent les murs, est dangereux, et sans doute appelé à se propager.
De plus, ce serait même un argument pour les associations qui se battent pour la réduction de l’émission de ces ondes sur le public.
Ce qu’il est aussi important de relever, c’est que dans toutes ces affaires, nous sommes en présence d’une organisation policière politique internationale, unique, qui agit en Europe et aux USA.
En France, je me souviens d’articles parus il y a environ dix ans, d’une organisation réunissant les services spéciaux policiers en matière de police politique, des pays de l’OTAN, dénommée “Alliance base”.
D’autre part, ce type de méthodes apparaît déjà très élaborés avec la Stasi de l’ex-RDA (la police politique du régime), et en France, où elles sont même utilisées dans beaucoup de domaines, autres que les faits politiques, par exemple pour éliminer des héritiers en écartant dans les familles des membres avec qui il faudrait partager l’héritage, en les rendant fous. J’ai rencontré plusieurs cas de ce genre. J’ai même aussi rencontré un homme qui était régulièrement persécuté par la police politique, juste pour qu’il continue à taire ce qu’il connaissait de ce monde spécial (celui des services parallèlles), alors qu’il s’en était éloigné depuis des années.
Très cordialement
Michel Dakar
PS : si vous n’arrivez pas à lire facilement le français, dites-le moi, merci, je continuerais en “frenchglish”
Voici un lien sur un site français, d’une association qui s’occupe de l’émission d’ondes novices (portable, wifi et autres).
http://www.robindestoits.org/
Voulez-vous que je contacte cette association, pour vous ?
Michel Dakar
Thanks everyone for the input & feedback. Michel, no problem with the French (and feel free to *tutois* me). The link is interesting, though you need not take any action on my behalf.
Another cryptic, but revealing statement coming from Ireland’s Tánaiste (he second-most senior officer in the Government of Ireland). He is talking about Operation Anvil implemented to fight organized crime.
As we speak, the Gardaí, in the light of recent developments, have begun an intensified campaign aimed at the disruption of the activities of the persons involved. Deputies will appreciate that it would be counterproductive for me to give precise details of what is involved. What I can say is this: the Gardaí must, of course, act at all stages within the law but if the actions which they have been forced to take to disrupt the activities of these people are represented by the persons affected as harassment or persecution then in my view so be it.
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/SP07000330
Thanks for another very useful link, Tikraine. I think this official was Michael McDowell who was minister of justice at the same time. Even calls himself Progressive Democrat!
Bonjour,
En ce moment, la mode de mon ange gardien personnel est la manipulation des leviers de vitesse et de changement de plateau de mon vélo. C’est innoffensif.
Je vais contacter cette association “Robin des toits”, mais pour moi seulement, et sans parler de toi, afin de les sensibilier au fait que les ondes sont aussi utilisées pour blesser sciemment des personnes qui dérangent l’ordre.
De plus, en France, il est toujours intéressant de remuer un peu les associations, car elles se révèlent toutes les unes après les autres, comme des organismes de protection de l’ordre en place. Cela doit être aussi le cas de Robin des toits. C’est toujours mieux d’ôter les illusions.
Je te dis à bientôt, et te souhaites du courage.
Michel Dakar
The more i look into disruption method the more i find that its closely based on another important term like “intelligence led policing” where police actions are based not on evidence, but intelligence. New trends of community self policing initiatives might explain this shift. In any case there is this very interesting article by Martin Innes and James W. E. Sheptycki FROM DETECTION TO DISRUPTION:
INTELLIGENCE AND THE CHANGING LOGIC OF POLICE CRIME CONTROL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM published in International Criminal Justice Review
http://www.upsi.org.uk/storage/publications/International%20Criminal%20Justice%20Review%20Volume%2014pages1_24.pdf
It is the first publication that i came up where they discuss disruption method in detail even giving examples:
There was a certain person who was a predominant person within a network, but there was no way that an investigation could get close enough for him to be arrested on the criminality he was involved in. But the research of the intelligence unit found that actually on a driving front, on a mundane driving front, he was picking up tickets for speeding, parking on double yellow lines, things like that. So obviously, he wasn’t that clean with regard to his driving situation. So it was assessed that possibly traffic could tackle him. So we had a main person involved in importations of all types of drugs, he had his own network for dealing the stuff. He was also able to provide other items, stolen items for other crime groups, involved in other crimes and none of that we could touch him on. So a week was done by the
motorcycle unit, the traffic department, looking at him, stopping him, checking his documents. Unfortunately he’s got a short fuse and a temper and he lashed out. He was dealt with for assault on police and criminal damage to a motorcycle and put away for three years. . .That was him out of the network, a main player, a main problem for this county anyway. But he wasn’t dealt with on what his core business was. (taped interview, Detective Inspector, County Force, Study Two)
One more thing. This year was held 4th Annual PhD Criminology Conference and Oxford student Chris Giacomantonio presented his work called “Governing multijurisdictional police work” mentioning disruption, new policing methods and lack of accountability.
Another interesting quote from “Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing”, A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers.
Disruption is emerging as an important tactical policing option for inhibiting the often sub‐criminal activities of extremists. However, to date the processes of how to design and implement effective disruptive interventions appear to have been relatively neglected. An established tactical menu of options for conducting disruptions has yet to be distilled from practice.
So one would have to make an assumption that police doesn’t even have a protocol about disruption tactics just blank page to do something.
Tikraine, my assumption is they prefer not to discuss their methods publicly. I actually wrote to Prof. Innes, who was involved with the report you mentioned, about a particularly interesting section in his book from 2004:
“In addition to the entrepreneurial mode of disruption, there is a more extralegal form of disruption used by police, where agents do not even attempt to effect an arrest or submit the suspect to due process. Instead, they design actions intended to prevent or at least make it more difficult for the suspected person or persons to continue to engage in unlawful activity. One simple way to achieve this is to intensify overt surveillance of a criminal target, but there are obvious limitations to the duration of this tactic.”
I asked whether he could point to any literature about this important dimension, but he couldn’t! He appears to be working very closely with the police in various European countries.
Reidar i think it would be helpful to look into crime displacement theory and problem oriented policing theory. Theoretical modeling of the situation using existing frameworks might give some insights into situation by trying to appraise the situation by sitting in the shoes of persecuting side.
Another thing that I found quite interesting was http://feltoninstitute.org/approach/morrisonsinterpretationofintrusions.pdf
It’s helps reconstruct and deal with traumatic intrusions into awareness that in some ways applies to targeted individuals.
another interesting article “REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE. ABUSES: LEGAL AND. IDEOLOGICAL BARRIERS”:
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__review_of_law_and_social_change/documents/documents/ecm_pro_071081.pdf
Even though it was written 30 years ago i don’t think anyone can deny it’s relevancy for todays world.
In my area I’ve noticed most come from the same area and faith initiative. There may be others, but I’ve only noticed them in certain areas, that is until May2nd of this year. The next day, I was being stalked on my way home.
These people want others to think that specialized weapons are being used on them. I’ve just read an Army engineers blog on the subject and I really do not think those people are actually smart enough to be mind readers, etc.
Scam artists are what they are. And, yes, often the police are involved as they see themselves as part of a group that has to do as they are told to protect the others.
Many are employed from the military bases not because they have special mind reading equipment, microwave weapons, or whatever crap these morons are proposing. They are on the buddy system of you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours. They are looking out for themselves and themselves only. You’ll see more mentally ill people in these areas because of their crap and false information, not because of their specialized weaponry.
If anything special is used, it is bugging devices and phone tapping devices so the target can be followed, made to believe something paranormal is occurring, and/or extorted for the purpose of getting the goons off them. Their continual harassment and stalking could give some a nervous breakdown or the symptoms of a mental illness.
They have employed this technique in my state for years. Looking back, it had probably been going on long before I ever noticed it. When I look at the ages of the people doing it, recalling what others have said over the years, and noting the way the people are always agitated and fighting it seems reasonable that this has always been their security blankey that made them feel safe.
The goal: get others to report back to the extortionists in time to save the world. The prize: listen to them brag about who they know.
Not limited to police:
4.5.1. SEPA will also implement more of a problem solving approach. This is complementary to compliance based regulation and enables the regulator to target its effort to achieve measurable results. For an environmental organisation, it means that sound evidence of harmful impacts or behaviours is routinely gathered and analysed. This analysis is used to diagnose the nature and scale of problems for selection. Solutions are developed that use bespoke and sometimes novel interventions, unique to the problem. Sometimes these interventions are within the organisation’s normal regulatory remit or require regulatory ‘discretion’ to be applied. Novel solutions such as covert tactics, disruption tactics, influencing tactics or partnerships could be used to solve a problem. Through a prioritisation and decision making process, the organisation allocates resources to solve a selected range of problems through start and finish projects or initiatives. Outcomes and clear success measures are set for each one and these are tracked and managed in a portfolio.
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/05/6822/4
Police will use disruption tactics against it’s own if they suspect them of corruption.
The investigation of corruption was seen by PSU staff as different from conventional investigations. In part, this was because achieving convictions of police officers appeared particularly difficult. Further
challenges include the demoralisation of forces and bad publicity as a result of investigations, hostility towards PSU staff by force colleagues, and the resource-intensive nature of PSU investigations.
Ideas for good practice in investigations were identified, including:
The successful use of discipline procedures or ’disruption’ tactics can, in some cases, be achieved more realistically and with fewer resources than convictions. These approaches might be used where the corruption is less serious, or where it may be difficult to achieve convictions. Efficient investigations might also involve focusing resources primarily on those most seriously involved in corruption.
http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Exhibit-DOC4-to-ws-of-Denis-OConnor-November-2003.pdf
More recently, concerns have arisen about the safety of cell phones (Stewart, 2000 as updated by Swerdlow, 2003; Hyland, 2001; Adey, 2003; see also Barnett, 1994), and even of LORAN transmissions (Dawes, 2001). These concerns, actually often fears, are being
stoked by rumors about covert use of portable radar by soldiers or police (Burton and Ohlke, 2000; Eisley, 2001; Jones, 2005), and by public but ambiguous announcements of military weaponry based on microwaves (Sirak, 2001), although such weaponry, even if
effective, likely would be illegal in military engagement (Williams, 2001). The underlying fear here revolves around the possibility of serious intentional injury or death delivered by microwave transmitting devices, with no forensic methodology to recognize the symptoms or identify the cause.
There does not seem to be any possible political resolution of these controversies, which are based often on empty suspicion about unobservable media; the only rational solution is greater understanding of the claims, based on a good understanding of the
biological effects of EMR. (Biological Effects of Microwaves:
Thermal and Nonthermal Mechanisms*)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0102007.pdf
Canada military very interested in through wall surveillance back in 2000:
http://marshallthomas.org/uploads/millimeter-e_doctrine_milliwave_radar.pdf
Disruption tactics include strategies such as interdiction, deportation, threatening interviews, or almost anything that would prevent a serious security event from happening. These preventative and largely secretive, policing strategies are seen as more desirable and effective than conventional policing strategies that rely on victim complaint, verifiable evidence, and public arrest and trial. In a conventional policing context, these strategies would be seen as forms of harassment and intimidation and raise a number of serious ethical and legal issues. It was this use of “disruption” tactics in the name of national security that led to the removal of security intelligence functions from the RCMP
and the creation of a separate civilian security and intelligence service (the Canadian Security Intelligence Service: CSIS), establishing the principle, if not the practice, of separating security and public policing in Canada.
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/rcmp-grc/_fl/eng/rthnk-plc-eng.pdf
Maybe this is new world order that Bush I was talking about back in the day. Very interesting tools of social control are being implemented in regards of how society operates. Person causing threat, real or perceived can be taken out at any level. There is a lot of room left for lynch mob mentality and medieval witch hunt activity, or simply getting rid of competition, once these tools can be influenced and coerced by hands of wrong people, since accountability for it’s use is nonexistent. Person is put in a very strange place where he is under enormous stress and placed in abnormal situations and has to figure out how to solve the problem he is causing to this mysterious authority and survive this trauma with minimal damage. There is very little room left for figuring out as it’s implementation is usually punitive and not about adjusting targeted behavior. Thats why your case Reidar is so interesting since it’s hard to define it even with these new methods of social control. You’ve relocated so many times and yet Norwegian police weren’t satisfied with results as if you’re still a threat to Norway or it’s interests.
Hi Reidar
I could not help but think about the title of your article a bit more, and I am left wondering that in your situation, are they really undercover “cops” when following you in another country? Admittedly, they don’t have any power to enforce law in another country than you or I do. So they may be cops in Norway, but in the country you are presently residing in, aren’t they just tourists?
This all goes back to an earlier question of what powers does your host country grant these people? Let’s say that somebody else who is purely a civilian (like a psycho ex-girlfriend) wanted to stalk you and employ the exact same tactics they have employed—is there anything legally you could do in your host country at present to stop that? If so, why not use the same recourse against these thugs?
Stay well !
M
Mohammed, thanks. Just to be clear, the Norwegian and/or other European officers involved probably serve mostly in a liaison capacity although I have seen them take part in harassment activities as well. The extent of the operation indicates it has been approved by the local (and most likely national) police.
10 novembre 2012
Bonjour
Voici un lien sur une étude juridique documentée, mais en français, sur le harcèlement par ondes électromagnétique
http://www.net-iris.fr/blog-juridique/145-louis-freyheit/30374/droit-compare-du-harcelement-electromagnetique-necessite-une-loi-francaise
De plus, on me signale qu’un certain Paolo Dorigo ( http://www.paolodorigo.it/ ce site est en italien) se plaint d’être lui-même la victime depuis des années de ce genre de procédé.
Cordialement
Michel Dakar
I have to agree to be suspicious about claims of exotic weapons being used. I think most of the time it’s a faulty thinking on part of a person who is under abnormal stress and trying to frame the problem in order to understand it. Most of the claims about such weaponry is made through reading patent applications or other unverifiable bits of informations from military industry. At the same time it would be wrong to dismiss and fault the person, just because he is making wild statements in assessing the situation. If you think about “disruption tactics” as weapon, it’s just as exotic as EM weapons. In a way it’s similar to medical student studying a medical book and “self-applying the symptoms” of all the illnesses. But it shouldn’t prevent from being aware of symptoms of mental illness that they are trying to induce. In the end it’s a some form of PTSD injury vs illness. If you think about disruption method to describe a targeted individual (being disturbed) right from the bat it’s obvious the duality of the goal. For casual observer unaware of measures being applied it’s quite easy to give credence to such belief especially if it’s coerced through rumor campaign. Also pressure from third parties to prove the claims only increases despair for targeted person. Positioning yourself for least damage and most observability can be done, before making creative (not destructive) leap in order to disrupt disruption. Horizontal nature of attack makes it very hard to see chain of command and understand where it could be coming from.
I’m reading
http://www.erdr.org/textes/bright_greenhill_levenkova.pdf
It kind of explains how innocent people could be targeted by mistake if authority is trying to disrupt the network and you’re just a node where intelligence is coming from unreliable humint sources. How many times we read on the news about swat teams kicking out innocent family home door based on info coming from screwed up drug informants.
this reports sheds light on the whole new level of bureaucracy coordination and cooperation that new era policing is bringing to the table and how disruption tactics might be chosen. The process is about group of officials from many different local and state agencies having some sort of intelligence about a person, when looking into it, when trying to find anything else that they might have done wrong: taxes, benefits, TV licenses, etc, if they can’t find anything – brainstorming for disruption tactics:
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/horr56/
It looks good on the paper, but no talks about safeguards to prevent abuse. No legal framework for accused to clear their name.
Of course no mentioning of psychological torture as disruption tactics, but that is expected.
Another interesting sound-bite from Ireland. Really interesting use of word “dissident”:
Minister Shatter added: “Organised crime comes in many guises. It will manifest itself wherever there is the opportunity to make financial gain. It will have no regard to the consequences for our communities, for the pain and suffering caused to those who become its victims or for the disruption caused to, and interference in, our legitimate economy.”
Minister Shatter highlighting the link between organised crime activity in both jurisdictions and the activities of paramilitary gangs said: “All the trappings or orations in the world will not disguise the fact that what we are dealing with are criminal gangs. Like many, I resent the fact that these groups want to characterise themselves as ‘dissidents’. There was a long and honourable tradition of dissidents in totalitarian regimes. But what these people dissent from is democracy itself and the rule of law. They are not just people who ignore the democratically expressed wishes of the people. They are prepared to engage in the most serious types of criminality to fund their lifestyles. They are not dissidents but criminal terrorists.”
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR12000271
“Criminal terrorists” who “dissent… from the rule of law”. An apt description of the organised crime section of the Oslo police!